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Abstract. The emergence of DTN as an option for sustaining communication in 
environments with high delay/frequent disruption have rendered existing access 
control mechanisms inappropriate hence the need for a new concept in DTN 
access control. This is primarily due to contradicting assumptions like low 
delay and constant connectivity on which the existing mechanisms are built. 
This paper discusses the security issues in DTN, investigate existing access 
control mechanisms and relate their design principles as well as operational 
mode to DTN. We proposed a lightweight hierarchical architecture based on 
AAA architecture concept and explored the DTN architecture to identify those 
features that will support the implementation of AAA architecture concept. We 
present the proposed architecture for an intra-domain scenario with a brief 
description. 
Keywords: DTN, Security, Access Control, AAA, Authentication, 
Authorization, Hierarchical. 
1   Introduction 
Advancement in technology and the quest for effective communication have led to 
the discovery of networks that are delay/disruption tolerant where some of the 
assumptions on which today’s Internet was built no longer hold. These networks 
ranging from marine networks, mobile ad-hoc networks, wireless sensor networks, 
military tactical networks to deep-space networks all share a common problem. This 
common problem is their inability to sustain communication in the face of limitations 
like intermittent connectivity, high/variable delay, asymmetric data rates, high error 
rates and heterogeneity. To address this problem, the Delay/Disruption Tolerant 
Networking (DTN) [1], [2] was proposed and the overlay network approach [3] was 
considered the most appropriate. Its emergence opens new areas of research in 
security which includes key management, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, anonymity 
and privacy, access control amongst others. Access control is the main focus of this 
paper.  
 
The need to have a common platform to carry out DTN services necessitated the 
introduction of a new layer called the bundle layer. The inability of the current 
Internet protocols to address communication problems in delay/disruption tolerant 
networks led to the development of DTN protocols (Bundle Protocol and Licklider 
Transmission Protocol) [4]. Our framework is designed to implement the Bundle 
Protocol [5] baring its complexity [6] because apart from being an overlay protocol, it 
has an in-built security mechanism to provide end-to-end data integrity and 
confidentiality as well as protecting the network from unwanted traffic [7]. 
References [1] - [9] are the existing documentations that give detailed description of 
DTN, its architecture and security.  
 
The primary goal of this paper is to propose an access control framework for 
delay/disruption tolerant networks. To realise the goal, we evaluate security issues in 
DTN and identify access control related threats. We investigate existing access 
control mechanisms and relate their design principle as well as operational mode to 
DTN.  We examine the DTN architecture and identify those features that support 
access control implementation. We propose a lightweight hierarchical architecture 
and justify why it suits the DTN environment.   
 
This paper is organized as follows: In section II we review security issues in DTN, 
section III discusses access control and existing traditional solutions, section IV 
discusses the AAA architecture mentioned in [8] and the applicability of its concept in 
DTN access control, section V describes the DTN architecture and the existing 
features that supports the implementation of AAA architecture concept, section VI 
presents and explains the proposed access control framework, and section VII 
presents the conclusions. 
2   DTN Security 
The inherent constraints (like long delay, frequent disconnection and 
heterogeneity) in DTN and the overlay nature of the bundle protocol make security in 
DTN a critical issue. The inability of existing security mechanisms to address security 
issues in DTN environment necessitated the need for an entirely new concept in DTN 
security. This led to the identification of some threats during the design process of 
DTN security mechanisms. The identified threats according to [9] are those associated 
with non-DTN node, resource consumption, denial of service, confidentiality and 
integrity as well as traffic storm. The resource scarcity nature of the DTN demands 
that resource consumption related threats [9] associated with masquerading and 
modification attacks [10] is given serious consideration. Masquerading attack is 
where a malicious attacker impersonates another legitimate entity to gain access to 
secret information in a system or network in the case of an outsider, or to enjoy more 
privileges in the case of an insider. Modification attack is where an attacker attempts 
to modify information it is not authorized to. It exists in the form of changing existing 
information, removal of existing information and insertion of information.  
 
DTN security is described extensively in [9], [11] and its goal is to ensure the 
protection of DTN infrastructure from these attacks through:  
• Denying access to unauthenticated entities 
• Preventing unauthorized entities from controlling the DTN infrastructure 
• Preventing authenticated entities from carrying out unauthorized services 
• Prompt detection and discarding of bundles sent by unauthorized entities 
• Prompt detection and discarding of bundles with modified headers 
• Prompt detection and removal of compromised entities 
The above listed DTN security goals can be realised with access control [11]. 
3   Access Control 
Access Control protects the network from unauthenticated entities and prevents 
unauthorized entities from using network resources. Reference [12] list and explain 
the three access control system abstractions of policy, mechanism and model. Access 
control can be implemented using either a centralized architecture [13] or a 
decentralized architecture. The decentralized architecture is either distributed [14], 
[15] where access control decision is fully decentralized or hierarchical [16] where 
access control decision is partially decentralized. A single entity manages access 
control in a centralized architecture while the regional security gateways are 
responsible for access control management in the distributed architecture. In the 
hierarchical architecture with combined elements of centralization and 
decentralization, a central entity manages access control of the network comprising 
the various distinct regional security gateways. The absence of an existing access 
control solution for delay/disruption tolerant networks to the best of our knowledge 
necessitated the investigation of traditional access control solutions to ascertain their 
suitability for the DTN environment.  
 
Reference [12] identifies Discretional Access Control (DAC), Mandatory Access 
Control (MAC) and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) as the three main traditional 
access control policies (solutions). Their brief descriptions are given below:  
• Discretional Access Control (DAC): This approach is identity based and 
leaves a certain amount of access control to the discretion of an authorised 
user. The heterogeneous nature of the DTN environment makes this 
approach inapplicable. The absence of real assurance on the flow of 
information in a system and its vulnerability to Trojan horse attack will 
encourage modification and masquerading attacks respectively which our 
proposed framework is designed to address.  
• Mandatory Access Control (MAC): This approach is rule-based and leaves 
access control management as well as definition of policy that cannot be 
modified by an authorized user to the system administrator. The use of 
system-wide policy and its ability to minimize abuse of applications by 
granting needed rights to individual participants make the approach suitable 
for the DTN environment. How this policy is implemented in the DTN 
environment will determine how limitations like complex configuration and 
determination of access authorization for each application are handled. 
• Role-Based Access Control (RBAC): This approach is rule-based and 
access control decisions are based on roles individual users have as part of an 
organization. The administrative complexity of this approach increases with 
increase in granularity since multiple roles per user is needed for stronger 
security. Fewer roles per user make administration easier while weakening 
the security. RBAC will not be suitable for DTN environment from the 
stronger security perspective while it may be suitable from the easier 
administration perspective. Its combination with MAC is a probable solution. 
 
The conceptualization of DTN to provide interoperability across heterogeneous 
networks and the need for the implementation of system-wide policy make trust a 
significant factor in DTN access control. Trust-based access control has been 
implemented using the centralized architecture with AAA (Authentication, 
Authorization and accounting) architecture [17] as an example. The conception of 
trust management for decentralized access control first mentioned in [20] led to the 
development of trust management systems that are either based on credential/policy 
or reputation [21]. The reputation-based trust management system is ideal for 
homogeneous networks while the credential/policy-based trust management system is 
ideal for heterogeneous networks. Few existing distributed trust management models 
used in traditional internet environments are: PolicyMaker [20], KeyNote [22], 
REFEREE [23] and SPKI [24].   
 
The classical AAA architecture and the above mentioned credential/policy-based 
distributed trust models are not suitable for direct implementation in DTN due to: 
design principle, operational complexity, scalability issue and unavailability during 
long/variable delay and frequent disruption [25], [26]. However, the implementation 
flexibility offered by the AAA standard and the applicability of certain concepts with 
slight modification to the DTN environment underlines the suitability of AAA 
architecture concept to DTN.  
4   AAA Architecture 
The Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) architecture shown in 
fig. 1 is a framework that defines a central entity called the AAA Server to support the 
AAA operations. The AAA operations are Authentication, Authorization and 
Accounting but accounting is out of the scope of this work. The three network 
requirements needed for access control decision making are: the AAA server which 
receives and processes end users requests; AAA Client/NAS which provides end 
users with access to the network; and the AAA protocol which conveys AAA 
information between the NAS and the AAA server. Examples of AAA protocol are 
RADIUS (Remote Access Dial-In User Service) and DIAMETER. Additional 
requirements needed by the AAA server to facilitate access control decision making 
and resource management are:  
• Application Specific Module (ASM) which houses user database with 
application specific information. 
• Policy & Event repository which stores on-going events as well as 
information relating to available services, resources and policy rules. 
 This architecture has a single point of failure, interactive, scalability problem in large 
networks, uses centralized Access Control List (ACL) amongst others. [17] – [19] 
 
 
Fig. 1 Generic AAA Architecture 
4.1   Authentication 
 Authentication ensures that the identity of a user requesting access to a system or 
services is verified before such request is granted. The three types of authentication 
[19] are: 
• Client Authentication which comes in the form of either user or device 
authentication uses the credentials presented by the client to verify the 
authenticity of the client before granting access to the network. 
• Message Authentication whose primary goal is to prevent modification 
attack ensures the legitimacy of the message source and data integrity 
while in transit. 
• Mutual Authentication which protects a communicating party during 
node compromise ensures that two communicating entities at any point in 
time use either sequential or parallel method to authenticate each other. 
 
Client and mutual authentication are implemented with either two-party model or 
three-party model [19]. Two-party model facilitates communication between two 
entities through a direct line without an intermediary node like a gateway or proxy.  
Three-party model which is our adopted model was designed to address the 
ineffectiveness of the two-party model in large networks. It engages the services of a 
third party to ensure that communicating parties only have access to resources and 
services they are authorized to. These models employ various authentication 
mechanisms that are classified using the three fundamental criteria of possession, 
knowledge and identity. Among the few mechanisms listed in [19], Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) scheme is considered for this work because of its numerous 
advantages. 
4.2   Authorization 
Authorization decides whether a certain privilege should be given to a user 
requesting access to the network based on submitted credentials. Entities involved in 
an authorization process within a single domain are User, AAA Server, and NAS. The 
User is an entity sending a request; AAA Server is an entity that evaluates the request 
and makes decision while the NAS is the entity that enforces the decision made by the 
AAA Server. These entities enter into relationship prior to the authorization phase 
which is either contractual (a formal contract or Service Level Agreements between 
user and the network) or trust (agreement usually initiated in the form of security 
association and facilitated by third party authentication server) [18], [19].  
 
The authorization process involves the three messaging sequences of agent, pull 
and push [18]. The AAA Server is directly involved in entities communication in both 
agent and pull sequences, and not in a push sequence.  Push messaging sequence as 
illustrated in figure 2 is discussed further because of its peculiarity to the 
delay/disruption tolerant environment.  
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Fig. 2 Authorization Push Messaging Sequence 
Msg 1 is the request to the AAA Server for credential (ticket or certificate), Msg 2 is 
the response from the AAA Server including the credential and pre-information, Msg 
3 is a request for a particular service or forwarding a packet and Msg 4 is a response 
to the request or acknowledgement of the packet which can be made optional in DTN 
context. NAS A functions as the User which uses a credential obtained from AAA 
Server to send a request while NAS B functions as the policy enforcement entity 
which uses a pre-information from AAA Server to authenticate a requesting party 
(User). Fig. 2 presents a scenario where communication between NAS A and NAS B 
does not involve the AAA server directly. 
 
The push messaging sequence as employed in the generic AAA architecture cannot 
be directly implemented in delay/disruption tolerant networks despite reducing 
communication exchanges. Modifying the policy distribution framework in [18] to 
reflect that in fig. 3 will make the push messaging sequence suitable for environment 
with high delay and frequent disruption. This will make every entity custodian of the 
four policy elements of PIP and PRP for policy retrieval, PDP for policy evaluation 
and PEP for policy enforcement. 
 
Fig. 3 Modified AAA Policy Distribution Framework 
Worthy of note is the complexity and overhead that will result from this 
modification. The fragile nature of DTN demands a simple solution and the proposed 
lightweight hierarchical framework is not designed to provide complex solution. 
While this concept will be adopted for our proposed framework, we will avoid the use 
of policy elements and rather programmed the designated components to provide 
functionalities associated with the various policy elements. 
5   DTN Architecture and AAA Concept Implementation 
This section examines the DTN architecture [2] and its suitability to implement the 
AAA architecture concept. The DTN bundle node is the main component of the DTN 
architecture implementing the bundle layer. The bundle node comes in three different 
variants of host, router and gateway with persistent storage and custody transfer 
capability [5]. The host while acting as the source or destination sends or receives 
bundles but does not forward; the router forwards bundles within a single DTN 
region; while the gateway forwards bundles between two or more DTN regions and 
also provides conversions between the lower-layer protocols of the regions involved 
in bundle transmission. Fig. 4 shows the basic DTN architecture with the bundle node 
variants involved in bundle transmission between terrestrial and satellite networks.  
  
Fig. 4 Basic DTN Architecture 
The DTN bundle node with its components described in detail in [5] is represented 
in fig. 5. The three components of the DTN bundle node are:  
• Bundle Protocol Agent (BPA) 
• Convergence Layer Adapters (CLAs) 
• Application Agent (AA) subdivided into Application Specific Element 
(ASE) and Administrative Element (AE).  
The BPA executes the bundle protocol procedures and offer Bundle Protocol (BP) 
services, CLAs send and receive bundles on behalf of the BPA utilizing services of 
the lower layers, while the AA through ASE and AE effects purpose-specific 
communication through BP services utilization [5].   Comparison of the DTN bundle 
node structure of fig. 5 with the generic AAA architecture of fig. 1 reveals some 
similarity between them. The BPA, ASE and AE of the bundle node either have 
similar functions to the AAA Server, Application Specific Module (ASM) and Policy 
& Event Repository (P&E R)  of the AAA architecture respectively or have the 
capacity to provide similar functions. 
 
Using BP SInt between BPA and ASE, and Prv CInt between BPA and AE makes 
communication between the BPA and the AA components independent. This is 
similar to the generic AAA architecture where communication between AAA Server 
and ASM is independent of that between AAA Server and P&E R. The existence of a 
common interface (BP Sint) between BPA and ASE as well as AE depicts the 
possibility of unifying the functions of ASE and AE which might be an advantage. 
With reference to section 4.2, BPA is designed to execute functions associated with 
PRP, PDP and PEP while ASE and AE are designed to execute functions associated 
with PIP. 
 
 
Fig. 5 Abstracted DTN Bundle Node Structure 
The ability of the bundle node to incorporate BPA, ASE and AE in its internal 
structure compared to the AAA architecture where AAA Server, ASM and P&E R are 
external makes it suitable for offline processing and internal decision making.   The 
bundle node with its persistent storage can conveniently store the credential and pre-
information used in access control decision making in the generic AAA architecture. 
Its ability to serve as policy enforcement point where it has and enforce its own policy 
is emphasized in [7]. The bundle node can be implemented as a server or a gateway 
(access server) [5], [8] and implements the Bundle Protocol (BP) [5] which is 
designed to fulfil the minimum requirement of the AAA protocol defined in [18]. Fig. 
6 is a flowchart showing the proposed authentication and authorization sequence 
when the bundle node of fig. 5 is implemented either as a central server or network 
access server. 
 
The flowchart in fig. 6 incorporates the three DTN bundle node components of 
CLA, BPA and AA with more emphasis on BPA and the AA sub-components of ASE 
and AE. Emphasis is placed on what happens when a node receives a bundle because 
access control is better enforced with the node in the receiving mode. The ASE stores 
the credentials like keys and certificate from the central server (CA) while AE stores 
the policy and history of past activities like malicious behaviour of a particular entity. 
The number of times the malicious activity of a particular entity must not equal or 
exceed is called the threshold.  When the BPA receives a bundle through the CLA, it 
sends the requesting User’s credential to ASE for verification. BPA evaluates the 
response from ASE to decide whether the User is authenticated and authorized. If the 
User is authenticated and authorized, the BPA then confirms the User’s reputation and 
conformity with existing policy through the AE. The BPA then evaluates the response 
from AE to decide whether the bundle should be accepted for custody or not. 
Whatever action BPA enforces is communicated to the requested user through the 
CLA. If the bundle custody is accepted, the BPA then proceeds with further bundle 
processing. 
 
 
Fig. 6 Proposed Access Control Sequence in DTN Bundle Node  
6   The Proposed Architecture 
The inability of the existing access control mechanisms to address access control 
issues in delay/disruption tolerant networks led to the identification of the following 
desirable features of a workable DTN access control mechanism: 
• Separating authentication from authorization 
• Supporting offline processing and internal decision making 
• Reducing communication exchanges and overheads 
• Simplicity and scalability 
Based on these features, lightweight hierarchical access control architecture shown in 
fig. 7 is proposed based on the AAA architecture concept.  
 
Fig. 7 Proposed Hierarchical Lightweight Access Control Framework     
The preference for hierarchical architecture is because of the need for a central entity 
to manage the activities of the various autonomous PNs and the AAA architecture 
concept because: 
• The AAA standard offers implementation flexibility  
• The components of the generic AAA architecture provide similar 
functionalities to that of the DTN bundle node 
• The three-party authentication model establishes trust and facilitates 
communication in heterogeneous environment 
• Authorization push messaging sequence reduces communication exchanges 
and puts less load on the server 
• The policy distribution framework can be modified to suit the DTN context 
  The architecture of fig. 7 assumes a single domain with three private networks 
and is designed to operate in a conflict scenario like United Nation Peace Keeping 
Mission. These private networks represent Peace Keeping Forces of three different 
nations deployed to different locations within a conflict region. The private networks 
are sensor-based with few DTN-aware nodes. The DTN network comprises the 
DTNAS, NAS of the private networks and the few DTN-aware nodes within the PNs 
with satellite facilitating communication in the network. The security gateways 
(NASs) of the various PNs functions as both bundle and security sources and 
destinations with security zone [7] existing between them.  Each NAS can add and 
process security blocks. The reference security blocks according to [7] are Bundle 
Authentication Block (BAB), Payload Integrity Block (PIP), Payload Confidentiality 
Block (PCB) and Extension Security Block (ESB). 
6.1   Architecture Components and Functions 
The major components of the architecture of fig. 7 are the UNSC, DTNAS and 
NAS. These components are described below:   
• UNSC: This is the entity that registers all the private networks (countries) 
designated for Peace Keeping Mission and the organization commissioned 
to provide the DTN services. The security information obtained during 
this period is stored and made available to the relevant entities at different 
times prior to network registration/service initialization phase. 
• DTNAS: This is the central server that coordinates the activities of the 
DTN network and registers the various Network Access Servers (NAS) 
into the DTN Network. During network registration and service 
initialization phase, the DTNAS generates and distributes Common 
Communication Parameter (CCP) and Certificates to all authenticated 
members accompanied with its public key. The CCP is used by network 
members for proof of authentication while the Certificate is used to verify 
the validity of users’ request. The DTNAS can function as Key 
Server/Key Distribution Centre (KDC) or Certificate Authority (CA). 
• NAS: These are security gateways that handle regional access control 
management. These servers authenticate and register entities into the 
respective private networks and have the capacity to generate CCP and 
Certificates needed within the Private Networks (PN) for communication 
and verification of the validity of users’ request. These security gateways 
in addition to their regional responsibilities also store CCP and certificate 
from the DTNAS needed for communication and request validity 
verification within the DTN network. NAS together with DTNAS 
implements the bundle layer that houses the Bundle Protocol (BP) needed 
for transportation of access control information. 
6.2   Architecture Description 
The architecture is designed to implement the bundle node of fig. 5 as DTNAS, 
NAS or End User in the respective private networks. It is based on traditional 
cryptography and designed to:  
• Use a Common Communication Parameter (CCP) for communication 
during bundle transmission 
• Provide security services on a hop-by-hop and end-to-end basis 
• Support policy-based access control 
The complexity of the node in terms of database size and computational capability 
decreases from DTNAS to End User. This is demonstrated in fig. 8 together with the 
relationship types of the architectural components.   
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Fig. 8 Proposed Hierarchy and Relationship Type of Architectural Entities     
The DTNAS and NAS of the various PNs are in aggregation relationship because 
NASs cannot operate in the DTN network without DTNAS, but can exist 
independently without DTNAS. NAS A, B and C are in association relationship 
because they hold a reference to one another through the certificate obtained from 
DTNAS after authentication during registration/service initialization. The End Users 
in the various PNs are in composition relationship with their respective NAS because 
the End Users cannot exist on their own since their existence in the various PNs is 
tied to the respective NASs. The following assumptions are considered: 
• UNSC, DTNAS and NAS can generate their own key pairs 
• UNSC and DTNAS cannot be compromised 
•  DTNAS and NAS provide UNSC with their public key and identity who 
in turn passes it on to designated entities together with a secret 
information for authentication purposes 
• DTNAS has two public keys with the first one used during 
registration/service initialization and the second one after registration. 
• Registration Request from NAS to DTNAS contains the identity of NAS 
and secret information obtained from UNSC while Registration 
Confirmation from DTNAS to NAS contains identity of DTNAS, secret 
information obtained from UNSC. 
• All registered NAS will be in custody of certificate and CCP from 
DTNAS as well as the public key of DTNAS given after registration.   
 
The Certificate and CCP are stored in the ASE of fig. 5 and the two phases 
considered for the description of the architecture are:   
1. Registration/Service Initialization: During this phase, NAS sends registration 
request (regReq) to DTNAS which verifies the validity of request by comparing NAS 
identity and accompanying security information with its database content. If the 
credentials are genuine and other conditions met, DTNAS sends registration 
confirmation (regConf) to NAS accompanied by certificate and CCP. The public keys 
of the recipients are used by the communicating party for securing the message. 
2. Data Exchange Phase: The security gateways (NASs) are assumed to be 
registered into the DTN network and in possession of the CCP, certificate from 
DTNAS, public key of DTNAS as well as individual key pairs. The CCP is used for 
BAB and other relevant keys for PIB and PCB. The use of CCP is intended to make 
communication within the DTN network free flowing. Any receiving node uses the 
CCP to access the BAB to authenticate itself and can only access the PIB and PCB if 
in position of the relevant keys. Since the BAB is the first security block to be 
accessed by the receiving node, we are of the opinion that the certificate from 
DTNAS should be housed in the BAB. Every receiving NAS confirms the DTNAS’s 
identity and verify the signature in the accompanying certificate in the bundle with the 
public key in its custody. It also confirms the conformity of the action with the 
assigned role as well as the reputation of the sender. The receiving NAS accepts 
bundle custody if the sender is authenticated and authorized before proceeding with 
further bundle processing.  
  
The sequence of action followed by DTNAS or NAS in verifying the validity of a 
request from another communicating party in either phase 1 or phase 2 is shown in 
fig. 6. The architecture is designed to be dynamic and permits execution of phase 1 
after the start of phase 2. This takes place either when an existing PN leaves the DTN 
network or new PN joins the DTN network.  
6.3   Future Implementation 
Future work will involve modeling the proposed lightweight hierarchical 
architecture in C++ and the validation of the result. In the course of the 
implementation, the following issues amongst others will be addressed:  
• How can Mandatory Access Control (MAC) be implemented in DTN to 
address the identified limitations? 
• Will combined implementation of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) 
and MAC be feasible?  
• What will be the nature of the CCP and content of the certificate? 
• What will qualify an existing NAS for expulsion from the DTN network 
and what mechanism will be appropriate? 
7   Conclusions  
This paper proposed an access control framework for DTN environment and 
established the applicability of AAA architecture concept. We discussed security 
issues in DTN relating to resource consumption, as well as existing traditional access 
control solutions and their limitations. We identified desirable characteristics of an 
operational access control mechanism in the DTN environment and explored the DTN 
architecture to identify those features that will support the implementation of the 
AAA architecture concept.  
 
In this paper, we have presented a lightweight hierarchical architecture for an intra-
domain scenario and demonstrated how the three-party authentication model as well 
as the authorization push messaging sequence of the AAA architecture can be 
modified to suit the DTN environment. We compared the DTN bundle node structure 
with the generic AAA architecture to highlight the similarities between them and 
justify the suitability of the bundle node for AAA architecture concept 
implementation. We have proposed an access control sequence for the bundle node as 
well as how the architecture entities will relate in a hierarchical arrangement. Our 
framework will among other benefits prevent masquerading and modification attacks, 
reduce communication exchanges and overheads, support offline processing and 
empower the entities to make access control decisions internally.  
 
This paper focuses mainly on design and gives an overview of the solution. The 
implementation and validation of the design in a delay/disruptive environment will be 
carried out in future work. 
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